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UNEQUAL TERMS: GENDER,
POWER, AND THE RECREATION
OF HIERARCHY
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn
ABSTRACT
This paper explores the relationship between feminist theory and rising
economic inequality. It shows how greater inequality reflects the valori-
zation of the stereotypically male qualities of competition and hierarchy,
producing a greater concentration of wealth among a small number of
men at the top, shortchanging men more than women through the rest of
the economy, and altering the way that men and women match up to
each other in the creation of families. By creating a framework for
further research on the relationship between the norms of the top and the
disadvantages of everyone else in more unequal societies, the paper pro-
vides a basis for feminists to develop a new theory of social power.
The paper demonstrates how the development of winner-take-all income
hierarchies, the political devaluation of families and communities, and
the terms of the family values debate diminish equality and community.
The paper addresses how to understand these developments as they affect
both the structure of society and the allocation of power within
our families in ways that link to the historic concerns of feminist theory.
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It accordingly ends by asking the “woman question” in a new way: one
that revisits the stereotypically masculine and feminine and asks how
they connect to hierarchy, one that considers whether the inclusion of
women changes institutional cultures in predictable ways, and one that
wonders whether the values that today are associated with more women
than men offer a basis for the reconstruction of society more generally.
Keywords: Feminism; economic inequality; family structure
Modern feminism (and American legal theory more generally) has been
slow to respond to an era of increasing economic inequality and the
growing dominance of the one-tenth of 1% (Noah, 2012). The feminist
critique of mid-twentieth century America arose during a period of rela-
tive income equality, and it focused on gender-based inequality. For a
30-year period from the mid-1940s through the late 1970s, class differ-
ences became less important and white males enjoyed a remarkable period
of relative equality among themselves (Goldin & Margo, 1992). In this
context, the routine exclusion of women from many workplaces and racial
minorities from full societal participation became impossible to ignore,
and once made visible, impossible to justify. Both mainstream legal
analysis, which focused more on formal equality, and critical legal
theories, which examined systems of power, contributed to the identifica-
tion and dismantling of the practices that had produced the wholesale
exclusion of particular groups from employment, influence or political
participation.
The challenge for modern feminism is to explain how women and the
critique of patriarchy fit into a new era of inequality, an era that has
increased the concentration of overwhelmingly male power  even as a
number of journalists (see, e.g., Mundy, 2012; Rosin, 2012) herald the rise
of women, accurately pointing out that women’s educational achievement
now outpaces men’s, the overall wage gap has narrowed, and women enjoy
similar levels of workforce participation to men. Feminist theory, then and
now, reflexively embraces equality and decries hierarchy. Yet, the theories
that sought to explain and challenge women’s wholesale exclusion from the
workplace do not necessarily work to explain women’s current places
within it, and women’s lack of power within the home bears no necessary
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relationship to women’s lack of power today in effecting relationships on
terms of their choosing.
In this paper, we set out the initial questions for a specifically feminist
critique that interrogates the current increase in hierarchy and the resulting
inequality. To do so, the paper first considers the gendered nature of
changes at the top, middle, and bottom of the income structure, asking the
question that has always defined feminist method: what patterns become
visible when the focus turns to women’s distinctive experiences?1 We find
that in an era of wage stagnation, the big winners have been those in the
top executive ranks, the financial sector, and the most lucrative professions.
These winners, who enjoy outsized compensation tied to something other
than market compensation for skills, have been disproportionately male,
and they have contributed to an increasing gender gap in income for college
graduates as a group. In the meantime, the most substantial “progress”
over the last 20 years in diminishing the gender pay gap in this country has
come from declining male wages among those without a college degree.
Second, the paper ties the economic structure to changes within the
family. Marriage has become more, not less, important to the fortunes
of men and women at the top of the social order. Two incomes become
an important component of middle class life for all but the economic
u¨ber-elite, and two-parent investment in children continues to pay off in
children’s social and cognitive development. Yet, the ability to achieve
stable relationships and provide resource-intensive caretaking has become a
marker of class for reasons tied to the impact of greater hierarchy in society
more generally and the persistence of gendered expectations about intimate
partnerships.
Finally, the paper argues that all of these developments  the creation
of winner-take-all income hierarchies, the political devaluation of families
and communities, the terms of the family values debate  reflect the valori-
zation of stereotypical qualities associated with hierarchy and individualism
at the expense of equality and community. Dominance games  short
term, reductionist, status competitions  are almost always destructive,
harmful to women as a group (plus most men), and inimical to the recon-
structive project. Understanding where they come from allows us to coun-
ter them more effectively.
The question on which we end is how to understand these developments
as they affect both the structure of society and the allocation of power
within our families in ways that link to the historic concerns of feminist
theory with gender-based power and the devaluation of caretaking. We
accordingly end by returning to the “woman question” (Bartlett, 1990). In
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doing so, we revisit the stereotypically masculine and feminine and ask how
they connect to hierarchy, we consider whether the inclusion of women
changes institutional cultures in predictable ways, and we wonder whether
the values that today are associated with more women than men offer a
basis for the reconstruction of society more generally. We conclude that
what feminism needs is an invigorated theory of power that explains the
reemergence of steeply banked hierarchies, women’s relationship to them,
and the failure to move toward a more “supportive state” (Eichner, 2010).
CRITICAL LEGAL ANALYSIS, FEMINISM, AND THE
ANALYSIS OF POWER
The enduring difference between mainstream and critical legal analysis is
the issue of power. Mainstream legal analysis, strongly influenced by liberal
theory, tends to treat individual decision-making and institutional opera-
tion in isolation. It typically (though not invariably) brackets the initial dis-
tribution of resources, pays relatively little attention to class, race, and
gender, and assumes (rather than interrogates) the capacity for autonomy
and free choice. In contrast, critical theory, from Marx onwards, has long
made power central to its analysis.
Marx’s original analysis after all sought to link the structure of economic
power to the disadvantages of the less privileged (see, e.g., Gabaldon, 2013;
Testy, 2000),2 and the contemporary critiques of inequality link inequality
itself to negative consequences for society more generally (Piketty, 2014;
Stiglitz, 2012; Wilkinson & Picket, 2009). Critical theory seeks to identify
sources of hierarchy, subordination, and exploitation and to make visible
inequalities, such as those between men and women, different sex and same
sex couples, and racial and class bias that might otherwise seem natural or
inevitable. Within the law, feminist theory and critical race theory have
attempted to identify the constraints on individual decision making. They
have developed explanations for how systems based on class, race, and gen-
der hierarchies arise and perpetuate themselves. They are sensitive to the
role of culture and power in influencing how individual and organizations
see themselves, their roles, and their choices.
It is ironic therefore, that in an era of much greater inequality, feminist
theory has yet to fully grapple with the role of women in a new, more ine-
galitarian era. A central reason may be what some have called “the death
of sisterhood” (Bennhold, 2013). Elite women focus on the limitations that
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keep them from reaching the pinnacles of societal power (Sandberg, 2013;
Slaughter, 2012; Wolf, 2013). Yet, the most trenchant recent accounts of
the status of women emphasize how little these efforts have to do with the
lot of the majority of women, who have trouble making enough income to
sustain their families at all. (Wolf, 2013). Critical theorists, wary of the
essentialism of late-twentieth century feminism, distrust any effort to
describe women as a monolithic group with shared interests. And the
renewed scientific interest in gender differences makes many fear that any
discussion of male versus female values or interests will simply empower
those inclined to see such differences as a justification for the existing state
of affairs. While many feminists, therefore, criticize the growing inequality
and certainly challenge the women who seem to benefit from it, a distinc-
tively feminist theory that explains the growth of inequality among men
and women, relates it to women’s place within society, and proposes com-
prehensive alternatives has yet to emerge.
The feminism of the 1970s and 1980s articulated a theory of power. Yet,
feminist efforts to link the status of women to a theory of patriarchy
appear frozen at the time of the classic debate in the 1980s between
Catharine MacKinnon and Carol Gilligan (Dubois, Dunlap, Gilligan,
MacKinnon, & Menkel-Meadow, 1985). These divisions in early feminism
between MacKinnon versus Gilligan were (at least in part) about defining
the terms of patriarchy and women’s source of disadvantage versus men’s.
MacKinnon, in her emphasis on an eroticization of dominance and submis-
sion, attempted to construct a theory of hierarchy that explained male
power. Carol Gilligan, in her critique of theories of child development,
wanted to revalue the stereotypically feminine, identifying an ethic of care
with women, and the devaluing of such concerns as an instrument of
women’s marginalization in the broader society. MacKinnon challenged
Gilligan’s thesis, arguing that you cannot label these values “hers,” when
he has “his foot on her throat” (Dubois et al., 1985, pp. 7475).
MacKinnon insisted that the focus should be on the source of male power
and that until that power was dismantled, any effort to identify traits or
values as authentically those of women was misguided. Gilligan responded
that she did not necessarily claim that the prototypically feminine traits she
identified were intrinsically associated with women, only that these traits
should be valued more highly and that failure to do so worked to women’s
disadvantage.
Looking back on this debate with light of hindsight emphasizes the
ambitions and limitations of late-twentieth century feminism. The sexual
violence that MacKinnon saw as central to patriarchy has diminished in its
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ability to exclude women in a wholesale way from the public sphere and,
yet, in other respects it remains pervasive. The change in the family and the
greater independence of women has led to dramatically lower reports of
domestic violence and women, in fact, appear to enjoy substantially greater
ability to form families and enter into sexual relationships on a variety of
terms (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2006). Today’s feminists are more likely to
applaud women’s greater sexual freedom than to worry, as MacKinnon,
did that it would simply empower more sex on male terms. Yet, although
none would claim that either patriarchy or sexual violence have disap-
peared,3 MacKinnon’s dominance analysis has not been updated and no
other theory linking sex  or gender  and power has emerged in its place.
In the meantime, however, even mainstream legal theorists agree that in
our new more unequal age, capitalist power has been remade. One key
challenge for feminism is to explain how this new era of inequality, which
in some ways benefits and in other ways marginalizes women, is different
from the patriarchy of the industrial age.
Gilligan’s theories, which were subjected to withering critiques in their
day to the extent that they assign particular traits or values to women
rather than men, survive. Contemporary feminists have incorporated the
values underlying the ethic of care into a more general test for a just state
rather than as a critique of patriarchy (Eichner, 2010; Fineman, 2010;
McClain, 2006; West, 2011). They argue that attention to the vulnerable
and those who care for them is critical to societal well-being, not necessa-
rily because these qualities represent either women’s authentic values in
opposition to those of men or because they constitute a primary barrier to
gender equality, but rather because all societies depend on the provision of
nurturance and the resilience it encourages (Fineman, 2010). Martha
Fineman’s vulnerability theory emphasizes the intrinsic vulnerability that
comes with childhood, age, and illness, and the societal importance of pro-
viding for resilience rather than writing off the more fragile and disadvan-
taging those who care for them (Fineman, 2010). Joan Williams, in her
portrayal of the ideal worker and the limitations of the maternal wall, simi-
larly calls attention to the failure to accommodate those with family
responsibilities as full citizens in today’s workplaces (Williams, 2010).
Linda McClain, Max Eichner, and Robin West complement Fineman and
Williams in insisting that the liberal, democratic state depends on the well-
being of children and that particularly in the face of greater inequality, the
state’s failure to assume greater responsibility for the preparation of all
children impoverishes both the next generation and the society that
depends on them (Eichner, 2010; McClain, 2006; West, 2011).
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Taken together, these accounts do not explain the relationship between
gender and growing inequality, nor how the remaining barriers to women’s
advancement fit together with a theory of patriarchy. Indeed, contempor-
ary feminism’s reluctance to endorse either MacKinnon’s association of
patriarchy with the eroticization of dominance and submission or to iden-
tify the ethic of care with an explanation of the role of gender in social con-
struction leaves modern feminism without a working description of the role
gender plays in a more unequal society.
Ironically, masculinities studies have been much more eager to examine
the links. It is here that analysis has turned to the effect of hierarchies
among men. Allan Johnson, a sociologist who helped to pioneer masculi-
nity studies, defines “patriarchy” as a male-centered, male-identified, male-
dominated social structure and maintains that it is male distrust and fear of
other men that operates as the core motivating force in the creation of hier-
archy (Johnson, 2007, pp. 323). Johnson argues that:
Patriarchy encourages men to seek security, status, and other rewards through control;
to fear other men’s ability to control and harm them; and to identify being in control as
both their best defense against loss and humiliation and the surest route to what they
need and desire. In this sense, although we usually think of patriarchy in terms of the
assertion of male power over women, it is also a system that valorizes the creation of
hierarchies that give men power over other men. While the oppression of women is cer-
tainly an important consequence of patriarchy, it may paradoxically not be the point
of patriarchy. (Johnson, 2007, p. 26)
Legal scholars have thus begun to examine the impact of greater
inequality on men, recognizing that men may be the biggest winners and
losers in a more patriarchal society. Nancy Dowd, in particular, has
emphasized that at the core of masculinities theory is the recognition that
men pay a price for “privilege,” that is, for the advantages that come from
the ability to construct more steeply banked hierarchies (see Dowd, 2008,
p. 248, 2010a, pp. 1373, 105123, 2010b, p. 430). Like Johnson, she sees
not only patriarchy, but also masculinity, as about the relationship of men
to other men at least as much if not more than it is about the relationship
of men to women. A man who is relatively well off, and “powerful” with
respect to the women in his life, may still feel “powerless” because of his
awareness of the other men who have more power than he does (Dowd,
2010b, p. 419).
Dowd shows that men can be both oppressors and victims of the
changes produced by greater hierarchy; indeed, Dowd argues that the nat-
ure of male hierarchies explains more about the persistence of rigidly
defined male roles than discrimination against women by itself (Dowd,
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2010b, p. 419). Within this critique, the question becomes not so much why
elite women lose out to men who work 60 hours a week (feminism has long
been willing to answer that question), but why men compete among them-
selves in such terms. Taking this critique further requires consideration
of the relationship between the top and the bottom of a more unequal
society  and that in turn requires consideration of the reallocation of power.
THE TERMS OF INEQUALITY
The story of the last 30 years is one dominated by the changes in the way
men relate to each other and how this affects the terms of women’s engage-
ment both within and outside of the home.
The period from the end of World War II through the mid-1970s has
been dubbed “The Great Compression” (Goldin & Margo, 1992). In this
period, which saw the growth of the Civil Rights movement and the first
wave of modern feminism, differences among white men, between white
collar and blue collar workers, and between North and South, narrowed
markedly (Ibid.). Politically, economically, and socially, the commitment to
equality reached a level not seen before or since.
The last 30 years, in contrast, have been labeled the “Great Divergence.”
Increased inequality, which began in the late 1970s and resumed after the
financial crisis of 2007, has been spearheaded by the divergence in male
incomes. Today, the Gini coefficient is higher for men than for women and
it is projected to remain so through at least 2035 (Schwabish & Topoleski,
2013). The increases in inequality within each race have also been notably
greater than interracial differences (Polarized America, 19472000). The
same is true for children’s cognitive achievement and test scores  the
changes attributable to income inequality have become much greater than
those attributable to racial inequality (Reardon, 2011). Moreover, even
within the same broad groups such as white college graduates, income dif-
ferences have grown and as they have, income has become a bigger factor
in children’s life chances (Reardon, 2011).
The reemergence of income inequality makes average differences
between men and women misleading. Over these years, for example, the
composite wage gap between male and female earnings has narrowed. But
the composite figures are meaningless. In 1990, for example, the size of the
wage gap in earnings did not vary much by education and to the extent it
did, college graduate women made a higher percentage of the “male” wage
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than those with less education. By 2007, that relationship had flipped.
Looking at all college graduates who are employed full time, the wage gap
increased between 1990 and 2008 (Infoplease, 19902010). During the
same period, it shrank considerably for those without college degrees
(Infoplease).The overall narrowing reflects the decline in male blue collar
wages, and it cloaks an increase in gender-based disparities for the upper
quintile of the population (Carbone & Cahn, 2013a).
Examining why demonstrates substantial changes in societal power. The
jobs that produce the greatest gender-based income disparities are “gener-
ally characterized as ‘power’ and leadership jobs, such as chief executives,
education administrators, and finance positions” (Ny, 2013; see Carbone &
Cahn, 2013a). The jobs with the biggest gender gaps on average pay better
than those with narrower disparities (Ny, 2013). In contrast, those posi-
tions with the smallest gender differences tend either to be low paying,
unskilled positions (stock clerks, packagers, receptionists) or to be skilled
staff positions (respiratory therapists, computer support specialists, opera-
tions research analysts, medical scientists) (Ny, 2013). The former do not
pay anyone well; the latter are subject to market competition that keeps the
reimbursement for skills, even needed skills in short supply, relatively
modest.
The positions that show the greatest growth in overall incomes have
occurred in arenas where compensation can be manipulated (Bass, 2012;
see also American Association of University Women, 2013, p. 16). The two
largest categories are the top executive and financial ranks, which account
for a significant portion of all income growth since the 1980s (Mishel,
Bernstein, & Allegretto, 2007; Mishel & Sabadish, 2012). In 2012, women
held only a little over 14% of the executive officer positions at Fortune 500
companies, and more than 25% of these companies had no female execu-
tive officers.4 Researchers find that the increase in executive compensation,
unlike increases in professional compensation (think engineers, pharma-
cists), is not market driven and does not reflect productivity (Belsie). The
outside directors for Corporation A may vote to raise the compensation of
Corporation A’s executives, and then go home and ask the board of their
own corporation for a raise to match the one they just voted for someone
else. To the extent that the board requires external measures of validity, the
executives may take a substantial portion of their pay in the form of stock
options. This in turn increases the pressure to produce short-term increases
in earnings, increases that they can produce by layoffs, shortchanging pen-
sion funds, cutting investment in employee training or tenure, and other
measures that may or may not be in the company’s (and certainly not
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the employees’) long-term interests (Dallas, 2012, p. 316). A 2013 study
further indicates that these increases in executive pay, and particularly the
role of stock options, can and have been manipulated, and that the manipu-
lation affects income inequality both by increasing gains at the top and
affecting the well-being of everyone else (Bivens & Mishel, 2013).
A parallel pattern characterizes the financial sector. The six job cate-
gories with the largest gender gap in pay and at least 10,000 men and
10,000 women were in the Wall Street-heavy financial sector: insurance
agents, managers, clerks, securities sales agents, personal advisers, and
other specialists (Bass, 2012). Moreover, while the percentage of women in
business schools has increased to almost 50%, the number of women on
Wall Street has dropped off since 2000. And in 2008 and 2009, the number
of sexual harassment charges per woman in the financial industry grew
higher than in previous years (Eichler, 2012).
Within the professions, women have done well overall while still losing
ground in the most lucrative positions. Among lawyers, for example, gen-
der-based differences in entry level positions are relatively small, but as
firms have moved toward greater differentiation among equity partners
based on rain-making performance, the gap between men and women part-
ners has increased (Flom & Scharf, 2011, p. 5). Among doctors, the gender
gap in pay has inexplicably widened in starting salaries, even after controlling
for specialty, education, and hours worked (Lo Sasso, Richards, Chou, &
Gerber, 2011, pp. 193196).
In reviewing the causes of gender-based differences in compensation, an
AAUW report commented that “[t]he U.S. economy is characterized by
“masculine” values of competition and individual achievement” (American
Association of University Women, 2013, p. 7). Whether such values
describe the economy as a whole, they increasingly characterize the most
lucrative positions: the top management ranks, companies with rank and
yank merit pay systems, the financial sector, corporate law firms, top medi-
cal specialties, and even universities, where the gaps between top adminis-
trators and senior faculty, grant producing research scientists, and other
faculties have grown.5 And this is true despite the absence of evidence
either that these changes have improved corporate performance or that
these qualities identify better business leadership.6 Feminists, of course,
have long decried the excessive emphasis on the “masculine” values of com-
petition and individual achievement, but these data indicate that the
emphasis on high stakes competition has increased substantially at the top
income levels over the last 30 years, and women, who have otherwise
gained in the economy as a whole, have lost ground where increasing
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rewards go only to the select few (see, e.g., Lipsitz, 2013). Indeed, one sig-
nificant factor in the gender pay gap is the nonlinear relationship between
earnings and hours; “a flexible schedule often comes at a high price”
(Goldin, 2014, p. 27) and competition to put in long hours is particularly
intense in the corporate and financial sectors that have experienced the
greatest income growth (Bertrand, Goldin, & Katz, 2008, pp. 34).
The disproportionate rewards for the few, the emphasis on short-term
earnings measures, and the more competitive nature of corporate manage-
ment have contributed to the hollowing out of the center of the economy in
ways that disproportionately affect men. The two groups who have perhaps
lost most are relatively high-paid blue collar workers, including both the
skilled and unskilled, and disproportionately male middle managers. At
one time, both groups might have started work for a given company
shortly after completing formal education, and received training and regu-
lar promotions on the job, staying with the same company through retire-
ment with secure pensions and health benefits7 (see generally Kalleberg,
2011). Today, in contrast, blue collar employment both pays less and has
become less stable and companies have reduced the middle management
ranks, outsourcing more of their work to independent contractors at home
and abroad, who absorb the costs of benefits and the ups and downs of the
business cycle.8 While the increased number of small businesses has taken
up some of the slack, the result for both groups is less stable employment,
a weakened web of health care, retirement, and unemployment benefits,
lower net earnings and a declining share of productivity gains going to
labor rather than capital9 (Kalleberg, 2011, p. 93).
Over the course of this 30 plus year period, levels of societal inequality
have risen back to highs last reached at the height of the Gilded Age and
the Great Depression (Noah, 2010).10 The “Great Recession” that followed
the financial crisis of 2008 has only made things worse. The New York
Times reported in October 2012 that income inequality had soared and the
top 1% of earners reaped a stunning 93% of the income gains in the first
full year of the recovery from the 2008 crisis (Rattner, 2012). In the mean-
time, the wages of the bottom 90% fell between 2009 and 2011 (Mishel &
Finio, 2013).
Political changes compound the growing income inequality. As political
scientists Jacob Hacker and Paul Pierson explain in Winner Take All
Politics, growing income inequality is not the inevitable product of capital-
ism (Hacker & Pierson, 2010). Instead, a political system has reflected poli-
cies favoring the economic elite, including lower taxes at the top, fewer
regulations, less enforcement, the evisceration of worker protections, and
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the erosion of the minimum wage (Hacker & Pierson, 2010, pp. 5472; see
also Lioz, 2013). Taken together, they undermine worker ability to form
collective units while strengthening management ability to circumvent the
control that might arise from either greater employee rights or regulatory
scrutiny.
Studies of income inequality show the class and gender impact of these
political changes. First, the erosion of the minimum wage has had the
greatest impact on the position of working women at the bottom of the
economic ladder, increasing the disparities between the 50th and 10th per-
centile of female income (Belsie). Second, the decline in unionization,
spurred in part by hostile legislation, accounts for 14% of the increase in
variance in male wages between 1973 and 2001 (Belsie). These changes,
which reduce wages, working conditions, and employment stability, have
contributed to a large-scale reduction in labor force participation, and dis-
proportionately affect men (Belsie). The decrease in the permanence of
employment and the declining share of corporate earnings that go to work-
ers either through wages or through taxes and public benefits is at the core
of the changes in the American economy and the American family.
THE RIPPLE EFFECTS: THE IMPACT OF
STRUCTURAL POWER ON FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
The impact of greater societal inequality  and the corresponding concen-
tration of resources at the top  is not simply a matter of differential pay
in the senior management ranks. It has ripple effects throughout society.
Some of the impact comes from long-term changes in the way that men
and women match up with each other. Greater hierarchy has reinforced the
importance of male status as an asset in marriage markets and reinforced
gendered roles at the top, creating powerful opposition to remaking the
family on terms that might provide more support for non-elite families.
While greater male inequality increases the concentration of men at the
top and bottom of male status hierarchies, women remain more concen-
trated in the middle seeking to pair with a smaller group of comparable
men (see Carbone & Cahn, 2014). Ironically, women in the center of the
economy have gained in income, workforce participation and the ability to
raise families on their own compared to the women of a half century ago,
while the men outside of the elite have lost ground in comparison with the
men of a half century ago. Women’s advances, however, do not necessarily
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translate into either greater societal power or greater power within indivi-
dual relationships because of the corresponding increase in the power of
elite males. Instead, the gender mismatch produces class-based differences
in family formation that give well-off women influence primarily within
relatively traditional marriages and make it increasingly difficult for other
women to form stable relationships at all (see Carbone & Cahn, 2013b,
2014). These effects on the family magnify both the changing role of gender
and the role of inequality in skewing the life chances of the next generation
of children.
The impact of growing inequality on the family comes from the intersec-
tion of three long-term societal changes. First, the sexual revolution and
the women’s movement that began a half century ago have increased
women’s independence. These changes occurred during the same period as
the shift from a manufacturing economy to one with greater job growth in
the service sector.11 The growth in the service sector produces greater
demand for the types of services women have traditionally performed and
indeed, women’s employment expanded more in the traditionally female
service sector than in historically male sectors such as manufacturing (see,
e.g., Rendall, 2011). Women’s greater workforce participation, in turn, has
increased women’s ability to go it alone in living on their own and raising
children. This allows them greater freedom to say no to less attractive rela-
tionships (see, e.g., Stevenson & Wolfers, 2006, p. 269). Feminist philoso-
pher Susan Moller Okin emphasized the importance of “exit,” that is of the
ability to leave an unsatisfactory relationship, in determining the power
dynamic in the family (Okin, 1989). There is no question that women as a
group, who initiate the vast majority of divorces, have gained in their rela-
tively greater independence from men (see, e.g., Baum, 2007, p. 48).
The second is the impact of greater inequality on relationship markets.
Greater inequality segments marriage markets (college graduates have
become more likely to marry each other), writes off a high percentage of
men at the bottom of the social order, and skews the ratio of men to
women within each market (Carbone & Cahn, 2014).
The third is the role of male societal power in determining not just the
number of potential partners within each class-based marriage market, but
also how the skewed sex ratios affect the terms of relationships. Women
may enjoy greater independence but they do not necessarily enjoy greater
power within relationships commensurate with their increase in the ability
to go it alone.
To explain the interaction of these factors, we turn to the classic work
on work on sex ratios by sociologists Marcia Guttentag and Paul Secord.
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In an influential book in the 1980s, Guttentag and Secord described what
they termed “structural” or societal power and “dyadic” power or power to
choose relationships (Guttentag & Secord, 1983, pp. 2427). They
observed that sex ratios, that is, the ratio of men to women, affect the abil-
ity of men and women to enter into relationships in terms of their choosing.
If men outnumber women, women have a greater choice of available men.
If women outnumber men in a given marriage market, in contrast, the men
can more easily chose among possible partners or end one relationship and
find another. Sex ratios, like other factors that affect supply and demand,
accordingly affect relationship “price” and thus bargaining power to set
relationship parameters.
The sociologists added, however, that the specific ways that changing
sex ratios affected dyadic power, or relationship bargains, depended on
who exercised structural power in the society in which the changes took
place. A high number of men in comparison with the available women
should make women more valuable, but women only control that increase
in value if they have structural power. At a time in nineteenth-century
America, for example, when Chinese men outnumbered Chinese women by
a 20:1 ratio, Chinese criminal gangs or “tongs” forbade their prostitutes
from marrying, and treated the men who tried to woo them as thieves
(Guttentag & Secord, 1983, pp. 2930). Scarcity increases value only for
the “owner” of the asset.
Even in less extreme cases, scarcity tends to increase male interest in con-
trolling sexual access to women, but it does not necessarily give women
themselves more influence. The authors cite the dramatic example of
Orthodox Jews in Eastern Europe, where boys significantly outnumbered
girls (Guttentag & Secord, 1983, p. 85). Guttentag and Secord argue that
the high sex ratios in a patriarchal society produced a reinforcing set of
practices. When women are scarce, men commit to marriage and divorce
rates fall. With stable marriages, the parents (and particularly fathers)
invest more in their children and, indeed, Orthodox communities in Europe
and the United States had lower infant mortality rates than other commu-
nities even when they were desperately poor. The high level of parental
investment helped to maintain strict religious practices, which in turn rein-
forced family stability. The women, though highly valued, did not enjoy
much autonomy.
Guttentag and Secord further maintained that societies in which men
have structural power but women outnumber men produce a different set
of reinforcing practices. In these societies, the men, who enjoy easier access
to women, become less likely to commit to any one person, and more likely
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to play the field (regardless of the promises they may have made initially).
The women become more distrustful of the men. They invest more in their
own earning capacity, and become more financially independent, less likely
to marry, more likely to divorce, and more likely to have and raise children
on their own12 (Guttentag & Secord, 1983, p. 190). Women in these socie-
ties do enjoy more sexual freedom, but they again lose out on their ability
to influence the terms of the relationships they enter.
Sociologists have attempted to test Guttentag and Secord’s theories.
They largely find correlations between the sex ratio predictions and
observed behavior across a variety of cultures, though with more robust
findings in the developed than the developing world (see, e.g., Angrist,
2002, p. 1033; South & Trent, 1988, p. 1112). In one study, evolutionary
psychologists compared different countries in an effort to determine the
role of gender in the response to the scarcity of the opposite sex. They
asked the question, when men become scarce, will the men, like women in
similar circumstances, become pickier about potential mates or will they
instead take advantage of the increased supply to play the field, given the
lower price of sexual access? The survey found, in accordance with
Guttentag and Secord’s predictions, that men preferred more relationships
to higher quality partners and that what changed most in response to male
scarcity was the women’s attitudes. They became less likely to marry and
their standards for an acceptable husband increased (Stone, Shackelford, &
Buss, 2007, p. 294). The researchers concluded, in other words, that when
women outnumber men within a particular relationship market, men
become cads. They can enjoy multiple relationships and they do. If women
will still have them with their faults, they marry. Otherwise, they don’t,
enjoying their continued access to new mates. Women become jaded by the
men’s behavior and they, too, become more reluctant to commit to a long-
term relationship. The result tends to be a cultural shift toward greater pro-
miscuity, more gender distrust, greater investment in women’s income
opportunities and less in men’s, and fewer stable long-term relationships.
Applying these predictions to American society offers a theory that cor-
responds to the diverging patterns in American families (although it does
not explain why men have more structural power). At the top of the
American income ladder, male high earners outnumber the comparable
women and marriages have become more stable.13 And family law has
shifted to provide the men at the top greater control over their children
and less obligation to continue to share their higher incomes with former
spouses after a breakup (Carbone & Cahn, 2014). In the middle and the
bottom, marriage is becoming more fragile or disappearing altogether
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(see McLanahan, 2004; Wilcox & Marquardt, 2010, p. 23, fig. 5). Marriage
to an unreliable partner has become a particularly poor deal for lower
income women (Carbone & Cahn, 2014). At a time of declining marriage
rates, the only group in society whose marriage rates have increased is the
top 5% of women defined by income; the top 10% have marriage rates that
have held steady. These women, taken together with the comparable group
of men, constitute the societal sector where gender-based income differ-
ences have grown most markedly and where highly paid men are most
likely to outnumber and outearn highly paid women (Greenstone &
Looney, 2012).
While the effects are not as dramatic, the emphasis on marriage has
increased for the larger group of college graduates as a whole. Indeed, col-
lege graduates collectively display many of the characteristics Guttentag
and Secord associate with high sex ratio societies in which men outnumber
women: the divorce rate has fallen substantially since 1990 even as it has
increased for the rest of society, the non-marital birth rate, as least among
whites, has remained low, and the likelihood that the children of college
graduate parents would be raised in a two-parent home increased between
1982 and 2006 for both whites and African-Americans (see McLanahan,
2004; Wilcox & Marquardt, 2010, p. 23, fig. 5). Sociologists have predicted
that as women outnumber men on college campuses, the opposite should
have occurred and there is in fact some evidence that college gender ratios
affect the terms of sex on campus (Regenerus & Uecker, 2011, p. 122). But,
with respect to family formation, college graduates, particularly whites and
Asians, simply replicate the class-based gender divisions in the rest of
society.
First, the much-heralded gender gap in college attendance turns out to
be a class and racial gap. Overall, the gender-based differences in college
attendance are much smaller for the group entering college shortly after
high-school graduation than for the group returning to school later in life.
Among this younger group, there is no gender gap for the top quarter of
households by income: males make up 51% of the children entering college
from these families14 (King, 2010). For the same income group among
African-Americans, the numbers fluctuate more, rising from only 41%
male in the mid-1990s to 54% male in 20032004 and then back down to
48% in 20072008. Among whites, the biggest recent drop in male atten-
dance has come from households in the bottom income quartile and,
indeed, for that group males make up only 43% of the total. The percen-
tage is even lower for African-Americans,15 with the drop occurring sub-
stantially before the similar drop for whites (see Marklein, 2005).
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Second, the likelihood that a collage graduate will marry and that he or
she will marry someone with the same education turns out to vary by class.
The more advantaged the college graduate, the more likely he or she is to
marry and to marry a fellow college graduate (Musick, Brand, & Davis,
2012). These figures may be skewed by the fact that women from less
advantaged backgrounds may be more likely to attend college later in life,
and at that time in their lives, they may either be married already or they
may not match up well with what tends to be younger male students.
Third, race further affects the result. The gender-based disparities in
attendance are greater for African-Americans and Latinos, even controlling
for class (King, 2010; see also Banks, 2011). Moreover, male minority col-
lege graduates do not enjoy as great an income advantage over minority
women graduates as do white male college grads (Carbone & Cahn, 2014)
and the geographic distribution may be different  the most successful
minority women are more concentrated and more likely to outnumber the
comparable men in major metropolitan areas (see American Association of
University Women, 2013; Cohen, 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 2009).
Finally, the income distribution of male and female college graduates
makes it more likely that men will earn more. As we mentioned above, the
gendered wage gap has grown for college graduates as a group since 1990,
and even looking just at those between 25 and 34, men’s median income is
greater than women’s and men outnumber women in the income ranks above
$100,000 per year by more than two-to-one (see American Association of
University Women, 2013; Cohen, 2010; U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). Further,
more than half of the women college graduates who marry non-grads marry
men who earn more than they do (Cohen, 2013).
Putting these factors together explains the continued emphasis on mar-
riage for the top women in society and why college graduates as a group
experience different family patterns from those without degrees. College
graduate women have enjoyed greater overall increases in income than
other women, but their increases have lagged behind those of comparable
men. The women in this group, on the whole, can and do find men worth
marrying and their relationships have become more stable since 1990 than
they were in the more turbulent 1970s and early 1980s (McLanahan, 2004).
Yet, without greater societal power, the women in these relationships do
not necessarily share equally in the benefits, a phenomenon that is painfully
visible at divorce. As women have gained greater ability to leave relation-
ships, both because of no-fault divorce and because of their greater income,
family law has also changed. It places less emphasis on post-divorce finan-
cial obligations, which have historically benefitted women, and more on
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shared parental obligations  which overwhelmingly benefit men (see, e.g.,
Brinig & Allen, 2000, pp. 128, 136137, table 1). Some of these changes
undoubtedly reflect fathers’ growing involvement in childrearing, but
women still spend more time in child care than men. A University of
Wisconsin study also found that although sole maternal custody had
declined for all groups, the ability to exercise custodial rights reflects the
father’s income. Married men enjoy a greater likelihood of a shared custo-
dial order than men who establish paternity in other ways, and greater
male income correlates inversely with the likelihood that mothers will enjoy
sole custody (Brown & Cook, 2012, pp. 2829). Overall, the net effect is
greater parental investment in children among those with more advantages,
but not necessarily greater female power within relationships commensu-
rate with women’s increased independence (see Carbone & Cahn, 2014).
For those without college degrees, the decline of relationship stability is
closely tied to the combination of men’s declining employment prospects
and the persistence of gendered norms. Men who are struggling to find
work or who have a comparatively low potential for breadwinning are less
likely to get married (Bianchi, 2011, p. 26). In a given marriage market, if a
randomly chosen woman becomes more likely to earn more than a ran-
domly chosen man, marriage rates decline (Bertrand, Kamenica, & Pan,
2013, p. 4). Moreover, a wife is more likely to cut back on her hours if the
additional income would exceed her husband’s (Bertrand et al., 2013,
pp. 2324). Indeed, over the last 10 years, low-income whites increased
their support for a traditional gendered family model while support contin-
ued to fall for high-income couples (Murray, 2012, p. 151). Yet, the likeli-
hood that the wife earns more than the husband corresponds to class. In
families with dual earners, the wife earns more than the husband in 70% of
marriages in the bottom quintile of families in comparison with 34% of
wives in families with incomes in the top 20% (Glynn, 2012). Sociologist
Paul Amato and his co-authors find that dual incomes among the better
educated correspond to greater marital satisfaction, but dual incomes
among the working class do not. Women are more likely to work because
their families need the money while they would prefer to spend more time
on home and children; those who work because their husband fails to live
up to the provider role are among the most divorce prone (Amato, Booth,
Johnson, & Rogers, 2007). Compounding the effects are male reactions to
the layoffs that disproportionately affect men without college degrees.
Newsweek, relying on the American Time Use Survey, reported that “laid-
off men tend to do less  not more  housework, eating up their extra
hours snacking, sleeping and channel surfing (which might be why
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the Cartoon Network, whose audience has grown by 10% during the
downturn, was running more ads for refrigerator repair school)”
(Dokoupil, 2010, p. 50).
This creates a no-win situation for women. The successful women are
better able to find similarly  or more  successful men, but once they
marry, the men in their lives tend to enjoy the greater power that comes
from a higher income. Less advantaged women, in contrast, enjoy less abil-
ity to create stable relationships, to find family-friendly employment (see
Williams & Boushey, 2010), or to exert political power (see Bartels, 2008).
But they do enjoy greater autonomy in their direction of their children’s
lives. Edin and Nelson observe that “[i]n a startling reversal of the way gen-
der typically operates in American society, unwed childbearing seems to
offer mom, and not dad, all the power: ‘it’s her way or the highway,’ in
the words of one father” (Edin & Nelson, 2013, p. 214). These results
further skew the effects of greater inequality as the top group replicates its
advantages through greater investment in children, greater access to educa-
tion, income and power, and greater ability to insure the dominance of its
sons  a small number of whom will be the dominant players in the power
structure they have created (Reardon, 2011). Understanding the impact of
sex ratios on dyadic power, and the corresponding relationship of family
structure with economic inequality does not, however, explain the more
fundamental problem of male structural power.
WINNER TAKE ALL POWER DYNAMICS AND THE
IMPACT ON GENDER EQUALITY
Both the increase in structural inequality, which creates more steeply
banked hierarchies, and the persistence of gendered notions of dyadic rela-
tionships, as they influence family norms, recreate the power dynamics that
have long been central to critical theory. These ideas about the nature of
competition, fear, dominance, and oppression are not limited to critical
theory. Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, for
example (Fukuyama, 1992), argued that the factor compelling ultimate
acceptance of liberal democracies and free markets was the desire for recog-
nition; that is, the desire of each person, including slaves and peasants,
for a measure of freedom and recognition, and that such recognition
could only come from the limits on the power of elites that occur in
liberal democracies. In contrast, more steeply banked hierarchies  and
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the emergence of the ultra-successful (think billionaires) or ultra-dominant
(think autocrats)  tend to increase the insecurities of even the relatively
successful or relatively powerful.
The insecurity that higher stakes competition produces tends to undercut
social solidarity (Hayes, 2012). Insecure elites devote more resources, for
example, to zero sum status competitions such as ensuring their children’s
entry into top schools, and express less concern about the increasingly
exclusive nature of such institutions. Increasing the stakes of competition
increases the incentive to cheat and to use success to rig the game to ensure
continued success. Stiglitz (2013) concludes that greater inequality under-
mines trust for good reasons.
The nature of competition itself may accordingly increase feelings of
insecurity in both the successful and the unsuccessful, which in turn may
increase the feelings of just dessert among the successful and opposition by
both to greater assistance for those on the losing end of the changes (see,
e.g., Page, Bartels, & Seawright, 2013). Such measures, however, which
include greater support for public education, assistance for children,
restraints on employers such as mandated family leave, and measures to
restrain and police the terms of competition, provide the foundation, not
just for reducing the impact of today’s inequality, but for greater gender
equality and greater support for families (see, e.g., Eichner, 2010; Fineman,
2010). The challenge for critical theory should accordingly be to explain the
failure to move toward these solutions.
The ability to develop such an explanation requires integrating the core
of modern feminism  the woman question  with theories of economic
inequality. Asking the woman question to explore these changes in the nat-
ure of power and society requires more than filling in a scorecard on the
status of women. It requires reconsideration of the values that influence
these developments. In an era where women have achieved formal legal
equality in the workplace and in the family, the question is no longer the
impact of patriarchal power on women but why patriarchal power endures.
Central to that analysis is the role of the so-called masculine values of com-
petition and individualism and the greater hierarchy and inequality they
produce.
One way of addressing the issue is to ask about the so-called feminine
value preferences: can they flourish? Feminine values fit on the more liberal
side of the ideological divide that today characterizes American politics (see,
e.g., Jost, 2006, p. 654),16 so could have a profound impact on policies.
Women and men do not, social scientists have found, describe themselves
differently in party terms (e.g., Republican vs. Democrat), which often
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reflect upbringing or community. Nor are there long-term differences in the
embrace of “conservative” versus “liberal” political identities.17 Researchers
do, however, find long-term gender variations in attitudes toward equality.
Men are more supportive than women of “hierarchy-enhancing” policies,
such as military spending or arrests of the homeless for sleeping in public
places. Women are also less likely than men to embrace ideologies that
maintain that some people are not as good as others or to promote class,
ethnic, national or sexual hierarchies. Psychologists have done cross-coun-
try comparisons, finding gender differences in the support for statements
such as “God made poor people poor” or “some people are just more
worthy than others” (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Stanford News Service,
1996). Similarly, on average, women are more likely than men to support
“hierarchy attenuating” policies, such as government-sponsored health care,
guaranteed jobs for all or greater aid to poor children. Women are more
likely to agree that “[g]overnment should guarantee everyone enough to eat
and a place to sleep” than are men (Pew Research Center for People and the
Press, 2012). These basic orientations toward equality or hierarchy help
explain political attitudes in ways that go beyond narrow interests or the
self-labels that pollsters often ask those they survey to select for themselves.
Studies of behavior, as opposed to the thought process that leads to
ideological commitment, find similar gender-based patterns. Male and
female management styles tend to be different, and female styles tend
to be more attentive to group cohesion. Moreover, women are less
likely to promote one method to the exclusion of others; instead, they
more typically combine multiple approaches in transformational leader-
ship (e.g., Eagly, 2013; Eagly et al., 2009; Shipman & Kay, 2009). Studies
of international development further find that giving women greater
say in the distribution of resources produces better results for reasons
linked to women’s greater inclination to take into account the interests of
others (see Desai & Johnson, 2005, pp. 5556; Kristof & WuDunn, 2009;
Ni Aolain, Haynes, & Cahn, 2011, chapter 11; Smith, Ramakrishnan,
Ndiaye, Haddad, & Martorell, 2003, p. 22; Unicef, 2007, pp. 2324).
The 2001 World Bank Report (Mason & King, 2001) found, for example,
that when international aid was distributed to fathers, they often spent the
money on themselves in ways that increased the likelihood they would father
more children. When the aid was distributed to mothers, they were more
likely to spend it in ways that benefited their existing children (Mason &
King, 2001). The problem with today’s corporate managers, as indicated
above, is that they advance their own interests, rather than those of
the community: they divert resources to short-term status competitions that
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enhance individual bonuses at the expense of long-term institutional health.
Women typically “invest a higher proportion of their earnings in their
families and communities than men” (OECD, 2010, p. 5).
The question for contemporary feminism is what to do with these find-
ings. Critical theorists  and, indeed, all serious scholars  are understand-
ably wary not only of “essentialism” (treating all women alike), but of the
overcategorization and oversimplification that comes from reductionist
statements that link women generally to any simple category like support
for equality (West, 1999, pp. 1021; see, e.g., Harris, 1990).18 These differ-
ences, after all, are statistical ones; they indicate that women as a group
have somewhat different preferences from men as a group for certain poli-
cies, and they do not get to the sources of, and reasons for, these differ-
ences. Yet, they do raise the question of what full consideration of
women’s preferences and women’s values, whatever their origins, would
add to contemporary theory and how it might contribute to creating a new
political and social coalition more committed to equality (Eichner, 2001).
Pulling these factors together sets the stage for what Becker (1999) has
called a “substantive” feminism.
Feminism begins with asking the “woman” question. Masculinities stu-
dies ask the “man” question. A “substantive feminism”  and substantive
masculinities  must ask the “human question,” without examining men or
women in isolation from each other. We should ask not just who or what
has been excluded, but how they have been excluded and how to include
them with the goal of building on earlier theories of power. Using this
approach identifies the problems with patriarchy as not solely rule by men
in and of itself. Instead, the problem with patriarchy is that it is an ideologi-
cal system that valorizes the desire for dominance  the dominance of other
men as well as women. The feminist and masculinities critiques of hierarchy
share a description of the harmful effects of the desire for dominance.
A substantive feminism together with a substantive theory of masculi-
nities would not be content to denounce all forms of inequality. Instead, it
would focus on the destructive aspects of hierarchy linked to a patriarchal
system, and the reconstructive project of creating a more inclusive society.
These destructive qualities include:
(1) The creation of outsized rewards and steeply banked hierarchies that
cannot be justified in terms of either a competitive market or proven
benefits;
(2) The celebration of unrestrained competition that increases insecurity
and undermines community;
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(3) The failure to recognize and restrain the cheating and rigging that such
systems incentivize;
(4) The denigration and dismissal of large segments of the population as
unsuccessful and unworthy; and
(5) The marginalization of the care work associated with women and
families.
Identifying the destructive qualities of such a system contributes to the
identification of a countervailing set of objectives. These objectives include
full inclusion in society, attention to the needs of the dependent and the
neglected, greater concern for institutions rather than individuals, and
emphasis on creating stronger communities (Eichner, 2010; Fineman,
2010).
While a reinvigorated substantive feminism would consider women’s’
role in encouraging such an agenda, it would not simply replicate calls for
greater inclusion of women in decision-making positions. The earlier
emphasis on civil rights  and on affirmative action in insuring the greater
inclusion of women and minorities  was designed to redress discrimina-
tion and the wholesale exclusion of women and minorities from more desir-
able positions. A reinvigorated feminism would move away from a
simplified description of oppressors and victims and from a focus on reme-
dial measures. Instead, it would ask what is necessary to promote the con-
struction of a better society for both men and women, where structural and
dyadic power are shared and how to break down the barriers to moving
toward that society.
CONCLUSION
A renewed feminist agenda should accordingly ask the gender question to
challenge the sources of increased inequality and to lay the foundation for
the formative process that modern feminism has already embraced. The
elite of our new gilded age valorizes competition, individualism and hierar-
chy to disadvantage all but the most elite women and the majority of men;
the increasing hierarchy among men and among women in turn remakes
relationships among and between men and women. The hierarchies reward-
ing competition at the top create vicious cycles that block more substantive
change. The feminism of the 1970s and 1980s used the woman question to
ask how such factors excluded or marginalized women; today, we need to
ask the gender question to determine how prototypically male values
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undermine communities and marginalize the majority of individuals.
Feminists should storm these barriers as we seek to develop a healthier
society that insists the benefits of technological advances and increased effi-
ciency are shared more broadly, creating stronger institutions, more equal
communities and greater investment in all of our children. Ultimately,
what feminism needs today is a new theory of power that explains the ree-
mergence of steeply banked hierarchies and women’s relationship to them.
To develop this theory, we need to ask:
What measures are effective in restraining destructive competition with-
out eliminating harmless or productive competition?
What are the most effective ways to limit the ability of a small number
of winners to dominate and disadvantage others?
How should we ensure that the fruits of increased productivity, innova-
tion and growth are broadly shared rather than concentrated in the
hands of the few?
How do we strengthen institutions, create jobs, and encourage broad
based inclusion in the benefits of a prosperous society?
How can we change workplaces to make them family-friendly and sup-
portive for men and women, and why have we not yet succeeded?
How do we protect our children from the increasingly destructive effects
of a class-based system of family structures, in which the children at
the top are increasingly likely to remain there, while children at the
bottom have few expectations of change?
These questions frame the appropriate challenge to the patriarchal roots
underlying the growing inequality in American society. Only by seeking to
resolve these questions can we create a renewed vision of human society
that provides for an egalitarian balance among, and between, men and
women (Fineman, 2010).
NOTES
1. Indeed, feminist method has been defined in terms of asking the “woman
question” in order to “challenge existing structures of power … identifying and
challenging those elements of existing legal doctrine that leave out or disadvantage
women and members of other excluded groups” (Bartlett, 1990, pp. 830831).
2. In addition, the most recent critiques of inequality link the structure of cor-
porate governance to the disadvantages to the weakening position of workers. See,
for example, Carbone and Cahn (2014).
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3. Indeed, MacKinnon’s type of Marxian analysis tends to be skeptical of evolu-
tionary reforms, claiming that without a transformation of the entire dynamic of
power relationships, genuine equality is impossible. For a summary of this perspec-
tive and its critics, see Kelly (2009, p. 122) and Rorty (1998, p. 7).
4. “In 2012, women held 14.3% of Executive Officer positions at Fortune 500
companies and 8.1% of Executive Officer top earner positions. In both 2011 and
2012, one-fifth of companies had 25% or more women Executive Officers, yet more
than one-quarter had no women” (Soares, Bonaparte, Campbell, Margolin, &
Spencer, 2012, p. 1; see Sandberg, 2013, p. 5).
5. One of the consequences of these shifts is greater emphasis on individual
advancement than institutional loyalty. The fact, for example, that executive tenure
has declined as executive pay has increased is a symptom of these changes. See
Lublin (2005), Kaplan and Minton (2008, pp. 23); see more generally Dallas
(2012), on the greater short-term focus of corporate executives.
6. Indeed, some studies find that women make better business leaders. See Bart
and McQueen (2013) and Joy, Carter, Wagener, and Narayanan (2007).
7. Executive tenure has declined as executive pay has increased as well. See
Lublin (2005) and Kaplan and Minton (2008, pp. 23): “There is some evidence
that the increases in turnover and turnover-performance sensitivity are related to
increases in block shareholder ownership, board independence, and Sarbanes-
Oxley.”
8. Indeed, male workforce participation rates overall have reached all time
lows. See Hooda (2012).
9. For the change in employment patterns, particularly for white males without
a college degree, see Murray (2012, pp. 175176).
10. Noah observes that a “more authoritative subsequent calculation puts the
figure slightly higher, at about 18 percent.”
11. “Goods production supplied about three-fifths of economic output in 1950
and about half of its jobs. By 2010, growth in the service sector accounted for two-
thirds of output and seven out of every 10 jobs.” Tankersley (2013).
12. For a modern example, see Mechoulan (2011), concluding that high rates of
black male incarceration have increased African-American women’s educational
achievement and employment rates.
13. See data cited above and a more extended discussion in Carbone and Cahn
(2014).
14. Class disparities have an effect on male performance in high school as well as
on college attendance and completion. See DiPrete and Buchman (2013, p. 23), sug-
gesting that part of the reason boys do worse than girls is that their performance
depends more on school and community reinforcement; both boys and girls do bet-
ter in better schools, but the impact of better schools on boys is greater.
15. For updated statistics, which indicate that the gender gap in education has
levelled off since 2000, and remains largely class based, see King (2010), finding that
in 20072008, for Blacks, the male percentage of children attending college
was 48%, down from 54% in 2004 (but still up from 41% in 1995), for Hispanics,
it was 48%, down from 51% in 2004, and for Asians it was 52%, down from 54%
in 2004.
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16. Jost (2006) stated that:
Conservatives consider people to be inherently unequal and due unequal rewards; liber-
als are equalitarian. Conservatives venerate tradition and—most of all—order and
authority; liberals believe planned change brings the possibility of improvement (Jost,
2006, p. 654).
17. Alford, Funk, and Hibbing (2005), whose twin study indicated that conserva-
tive versus liberal beliefs may be influenced by genetic predispositions, nonetheless
found that party and religious identification tended to reflect upbringing more than
basic orientations toward values such as hierarchy versus equality.
18. Harris (1990) argued that both dominance feminism, as exemplified in
Catharine MacKinnon’s work, and cultural feminism, as exemplified in Robin
West’s work, essentialize women’s experiences in ways that obscure differences such
as race and class.
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